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ABSTRACT
The world-wide aviation system is one of the most complex
dynamical systems ever developed and is generating data at
an extremely rapid rate. Most modern commercial aircraft
record several hundred flight parameters including informa-
tion from the guidance, navigation, and control systems, the
avionics and propulsion systems, and the pilot inputs into
the aircraft. These parameters may be continuous measure-
ments or binary or categorical measurements recorded in one
second intervals for the duration of the flight. Currently,
most approaches to aviation safety are reactive, meaning
that they are designed to react to an aviation safety inci-
dent or accident. In this paper, we discuss a novel approach
based on the theory of multiple kernel learning to detect po-
tential safety anomalies in very large data bases of discrete
and continuous data from world-wide operations of commer-
cial fleets. We pose a general anomaly detection problem
which includes both discrete and continuous data streams,
where we assume that the discrete streams have a causal
influence on the continuous streams. We also assume that
atypical sequence of events in the discrete streams can lead
to off-nominal system performance. We discuss the appli-
cation domain, novel algorithms, and also discuss results on
real-world data sets. Our algorithm uncovers operationally
significant events in high dimensional data streams in the
aviation industry which are not detectable using state of
the art methods.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
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1. INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2000, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 was
enroute from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico to Seattle Washing-
ton when it experienced a catastrophic failure resulting in
the death of 89 passengers and flight personnel as it dived
from about 18000 feet into the Pacific Ocean. Analysis of
data from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the wreck-
age indicated that the probable cause of the accident was
”a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight
failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew as-
sembly’s acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused
by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines’ insufficient
lubrication of the jackscrew assembly.” [3] The precursors to
this accident and other accidents due to mechanical issues
and human factors are often evident in large data sets from
Flight Data Recorders as well as textual reports written by
the flight crew and other persons involved in flight opera-
tions. Indeed, an informal study at NASA of FDR data
from similar aircraft showed that a multivariate query on
certain parameters in the FDR could uncover aircraft with
similar mechanical problems.
Boeing recently completed a comprehensive statistical sur-
vey of commercial aircraft accidents worldwide [18] which
shows a dramatic drop in the accident rate, the fatal ac-
cident rate, and also the hull-loss accident rate as shown
in Figure 1. These advances have been due to a signifi-
cant investment in near-term technologies to improve air-
craft safety. However, assuming that air traffic continues to
grow at a modest rate of only 3% per year, over the next
two decades that will lead to nearly doubling the air traffic
within the US. The increased density of operations, com-
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100033686 2019-08-30T11:54:15+00:00Z
Figure 1: This figure from Boeing’s Statistical Summary of
Commercial Jet Accidents in 2007 shows that the fatality
rate of accidents in the United States has dropped signif-
icantly over the past five decades. However, as air traffic
continues to grow, it is essential to develop techniques to re-
veal precursors to safety incidents and accidents from large
flight data bases.
bined with increased demands on service and availability of
aircraft can lead to a significant number of aviation accidents
even with the current extremely low accident rate.
In 2007, NASA established an archive that contains data
from flight data recorders from most of the major carriers
in the US. The archive, known as the Distributed National
FOQA (Flight Operations Quality Assurance) Archive (DNFA)
contains over two million flights today and covers over 10
major carriers. Typical FOQA parameters consist of both
continuous and discrete (categorical) data from the avionics,
propulsion system, control surfaces, landing gear, the cock-
pit switch positions, and other critical systems. These data
sets can have up to 500 parameters and are sampled at 1
Hz. For a moderate sized fleet that operates 1000 flights per
day, these FOQA data sets become very large. Due to pro-
prietary and legal issues, these data are not shared between
airlines or directly with the government. Thus, in the DNFA
architecture, each carrier has its own data repository, and
a primary requirement of the DNFA is that the data from
multiple carriers not be centralized. Data in the DNFA is
anonymized so that flight numbers and marks identifying
pilots and crew are removed. In this paper, we discuss the
problem of detecting anomalies in FOQA data that may
be indicative of safety issues due to mechanical or human
factors issues. We present the results of our anomaly detec-
tion algorithms on real FOQA data from a regional carrier.
This work is part of a comprehensive plan within the NASA
Integrated ViIVHM project to analyze numerical data from
DNFA and text reports from DNAA to assess health of large
commercial fleets of aircraft.
2. BACKGROUND
Figure 2: This figure shows our overall approach to address-
ing safety issues in the aviation system. The automatic iden-
tification and causal analysis of hazards from continuous and
discrete data streams is the subject of this paper [?].
This paper addresses the problem of detecting anomalies
in high-dimensional, multivariate data streams containing
both discrete and continuous channels. We assume that we
are given data from a data generating process that can be
functionally described by the following equations:
ht = Γ(h
∗
t−1) (1)
xt = Ψ(x
∗
t−1,h
∗
t , ut) (2)
yt = Ω(xt) (3)
We assume that the function Γ determining the evolution of
the hidden system state ht is unknown. We also assume that
the function Ψ, which governs the evolution of the continu-
ous state vector is also unknown. We assume that the vector
x is an N dimensional state vector, and x∗t−1 is its history
for the last D time steps: x∗t−1 = [xt−D,xt−D+1, ...,xt−1].
The quantity ut is the observed system input, and yt is the
observed system output which can contain discrete, cate-
gorical, and continuous features. We assume that the entire
data that is available, covering both inputs and outputs is
given by the set (U ,Y).
In real-world flight operations, the pilot inputs U are de-
termined by standard-operating procedure: for a given air-
port, aircraft, weather conditions, instructions from air traf-
fic control, and other contextual elements of the flight, the
flight procedures are well determined. However, while we
can assume that all pilots are attempting to follow the stan-
dard operating procedures, some may deviate from these
procedures which could lead to a different input sequence U ′,
resulting in a different set of observed flight characteristics
Y ′. The evolution of Y ′ over time will necessarily be differ-
ent than that of the nominal case. This does not imply that
the pair U ′,Y ′ is an unsafe flight– it is simply not typically
observed. Our goal in this paper is to develop algorithms
that can detect if the discrete pilot inputs U , combined with
the observation vector Y are nominal or off nominal and to
diagnose the reason why such a potential anomalous event
was so designated.
2.1 Current State-Of-The-Art Algorithms on
Anomaly Detection
Data-driven anomaly detection is an active area of re-
search (see [6] for a detailed survey). For example, there
are many anomaly detection methods that identify anoma-
lies in the vector space. However SequenceMiner [4] is the
only algorithm that can analyze discrete sequences. Prelim-
inary experiments with SequenceMiner on data from com-
mercial aviation indicate that it is able to find examples of
mode confusion, in which a pilot loses track of auto pilot
mode changes and therefore effects anomalous switching be-
havior in order to determine the auto pilot mode. Because
cockpit switch behavior is represented mostly by sequences
of discrete switches, SequenceMiner is a natural algorithm
for finding anomalies in such sequences. Soem details on Se-
quenceMiner will be provided in Section ?? .Other anomaly
detection methods, such as Orca [2] and the Inductive Mon-
itoring System (IMS) [11], find anomalies in multivariate
continuous data. Both Orca and IMS are distance-based
anomaly detection methods, in that they use a metric re-
lated to distance, such as the average Euclidean distance
to its k-nearest neighbors, to assess the anomalousness of
a point. Clearly, the greater the value of this metric, the
more anomalous a data point is. In principle, one could use
Orca and IMS with heterogeneous data—data containing
both discrete and continuous variables. However, in IMS
the discrete variables’ contributions to the Euclidean dis-
tance may not reflect their true importance, and finding the
appropriate way to incorporate distances in the discrete and
continuous spaces into a common metric is a problem with
no clear solution. Additionally, Orca and IMS do not learn
the sequential dependencies between points in the training
data. Here we would like to identify an anomaly detection
method that incorporates both continuous and discrete se-
quences and is able to identify anomalies within each sepa-
rately but also across the two types of data.
Kernel methods [16] have been used for many different
types of data with various types of features such as graphs [12]
and multiple feature types in computer vision such as color [7],
shape, texture [19], and graphs based on image segmen-
tations [9]. Kernel functions map pairs of objects to the
similarity between those objects, with a value of 1 indi-
cating maximum similarity and 0 indicating no similarity.
Therefore, subject to Mercer’s conditions [5], one can de-
vise a kernel function measuring similarity among objects
of any type and incorporate this into kernel methods for
classification, regression, or anomaly detection. This flexi-
bility to incorporate kernel functions of different types moti-
vates the question of whether multiple such kernel functions
can be incorporated simultaneously. This question brought
about the field of Multiple Kernel Learning (MKL) [1, 13].
MKL replaces individual kernel functions with combinations
of kernel functions, thereby allowing the kernel method to
use multiple kernels simultaneously. MKL was initially used
with multiple copies of the same kernel function with differ-
ent hyperparameter settings. However, MKL has been found
most effective in cases where the different kernel functions
use different attributes, such as in computer vision where
SVMs that use a convex combination of kernels using mul-
tiple feature sets such as color, shape, and texture, have
been found to outperform SVMs that only use one of the
kernels [9].
MKL appears to be a promising way to satisfy our re-
quirement of incorporating both discrete and continuous se-
quences in anomaly detection. We use the kernel anomaly
detection method known as one-class Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVMs) [17, 15]. We incorporate a kernel over dis-
crete sequences which is based on the normalized Longest
Common Subsequence (nLCS) measure used in SequenceM-
iner and a kernel over continuous sequences that makes use
of the Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) [14] repre-
sentation. We demonstrate that this Multiple Kernel Anomaly
Detection (MKAD) algorithm outperforms Orca and Se-
quenceMiner at finding operationally significant anomalies
in aviation safety data. To our knowledge, MKAD has never
been used with sequences or within one-class SVM prior to
our very recent poster which shows preliminary results of an
earlier version of our algorithm on synthetic data only [8].
3. ALGORITHM
We first give a brief but general description of multiple
kernel learning based detection technique. Then we describe
the two kernels that we use within our model.
3.1 Multiple Kernel Learning based Detection
As mentioned earlier one of the major advantage of kernel
based methods compared to other techniques is their ability
to combine information from multiple data sources. The way
this improved knowledge about the problem can be incor-
porated in the core optimization problem is very simple yet
meaningful. The resultant kernel K can be a convex com-
bination of all kernels computed over multiple features i.e.
K(~xi, ~xj) =
∑n
p=1 ηikˆp(~xi, ~xj), with ηi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 ηi = 1.
Here kˆp(~xi, ~xj) represents the p
th kernel computed, and η
to weight individual kernels. Here we take advantage of
the multiple kernel learning approach to incorporate more
knowledge in the decision process so that we can achieve an
improvement in detecting anomalies in complex heteroge-
neous systems that involves various data sources and data
structures. Since we are interested in anomaly detection we
have used the classical One-class SVMs [15] as our core algo-
rithm. One-class SVM is a semi-supervised learning method
that finds a set of outliers using a decision boundary. Below
we will provide a brief description of some of the properties
of the mapping function and talk a bit on the optimization
problem of One-class SVM.
One-class SVMs constructs an optimal hyperplane in the
high dimensional feature space by maximizing the margin
between the origin and the hyperplane. This is done by
solving an optimization problem [15]. The dual form of the
optimization can be written as,
minimize Q =
1
2
∑
i,j
αiαjk (xi, xj)
subject to 0 ≤ αi ≤
1
ℓν
,
∑
i
αi = 1, ρ ≥ 0, ν ∈ [0, 1] (4)
where αi is Lagrange multiplier, ν is a user specified param-
eter that defines the upper bound on the training error, and
also the lower bound on the fraction of training points that
are support vectors, ρ is a bias term and k is the kernel ma-
trix. Once this problem is solved at least νℓ training points
with non-zero Lagrangian multipliers (~α) are obtained and
these points {xi : i ∈ [ℓ] , αi > 0} are called support vectors.
The selected points can be marginal Im = {i : 0 < αi < 1}
and non-marginal Inm = {i : αi = 1} support vectors.
Once ~α is obtained, SVMs compute the following decision
function.
f(~xj) = sign(
∑
i∈Im
αik(~xi, ~xj) +
∑
i∈Inm
k(~xi, ~xj)− ρ)
(5)
If the decision function predicts a negative label for a given
test point xj , then it is classified as an outlier. Test examples
with positive labels are classified normal.
3.2 Building Kernel
In this research our kernel takes the form of,
k(~xi, ~xj) = ηKd(~xi, ~xj) + (1− η)Kc(~xi, ~xj) (6)
whereKd is a kernel over discrete sequences, Kc is a kernel
over discretizedd continuous time series, and η is used to
weight the two kernels (in this paper, we always use η = 0.5).
We have1
Kd(~xi, ~xj) =
|LCS(~xi, ~xj)|√
l~xi l~xj
, (7)
where l~x is the number of symbols in sequence ~x. Given
two sequences X and Z, Z is a subsequence of X if re-
moving some symbols from X produces Z. Z is a common
subsequence of sequences ~xi and ~xj if Z is a subsequence
of both ~xi and ~xj . The longest such subsequence of ~xi and
~xj is called the longest common subsequence (LCS) and is
denoted by LCS(~xi, ~xj) and |LCS(~xi, ~xj)| is length. LCS
is a useful metric for measuring similarity between discrete
sequences for two reasons. First, it is not restricted to a
location-based one-to-one match—the LCS can be located
within different parts of the two original sequences. Second,
the LCS length has an optimal substructure property which
is the foundation of a well-known dynamic programming al-
gorithm. In particular, the algorithm builds up a table L
such that entry L(i, j) is the length of the LCS of the first
i symbols in ~xi and the first j symbols in ~xj . Entry L(i, j)
only depends on entries of L for lower values of i and j.
Details on the Hunt-Szymanski algorithm which we used to
calculate LCS can be found in [10].
The continuous kernel Kc(~xi, ~xj) is inversely proportional
to the distance between the SAX representations [14] of ~xi
and ~xj . Briefly, ~xi and ~xj are first divided into some number
w bins along the time axis. That is, if both vectors have
v variables for n consecutive time points each, then they
are divided into w consecutive bins with all v variables and
of mostly equal time length (all but the last one contain
⌊n/w⌋ consecutive time steps and the last bin contains the
remainder). The mean value of each variable in each frame
is then calculated. So, for example, ~¯xiab is the mean of the
values in the bth time interval of the ath variable of ~xi,
1In all equations related to the discrete and continuous ker-
nels, we assume that the discrete and continuous parts of
the data points ~xi and ~xj are selected. To reduce notational
clutter, we will not include operators to select the discrete
or continuous parts of the data points.
~¯xiab = ⌊n/w⌋
⌊n/w⌋b∑
k=⌊n/w⌋(b−1)+1
~xiak. (8)
where ~xiak is the kth time point in the ath variable of ~xi.
Then, for each variable, we fit a normal distribution to all
the training data, choose a number of bins ca, and then find
equiprobable bins with breakpoints βa,1, βa,2, . . . , βa,ca−1 such
that the area under the normal density function for x ≤ βa,1,
x ∈ [βa,k, βa,k+1] for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ca − 2}, and for
x ≥ βa,ca−1 are each 1/ca. We assign each bin a discrete
label (e.g., letters A, B, C, etc.). We replace ~¯xiab with the
corresponding discrete label.
So ~xi and ~xj started off having v continuous variables and
n time points per variable, and are replaced by a new ma-
trix that still has v variables but has w discrete symbols per
variable representing the means of that variable in the w
consecutive time windows. The advantages of implementing
SAX are that both the time and amplitude discretization
result in reduction of the noise content and as well as di-
mensionality of the data. The distance between the SAX
representations of ~xi and ~xj is simply the nLCS length as
shown above in equation (7). Looking at empirical formula-
tion of the similarity measure and how the above kernels are
constructed it is pretty strightforward to understand that
both Kd and Kc are symmetric positive semi-definite matri-
ces.
3.3 Baseline Algorithms
Both Orca and SequenceMiner have been chosen as the
baseline algorithms. To the author’s knowledge, besides
Orca no other anomaly detection algorithm exists that can
handle both discrete and continuous data streams. Orca
[2] is a K-nearest neighbor approach outlier detection algo-
rithm with a modified pruning technique. For continuous
data, Orca takes a nominal reference data set and calcu-
lates the nearest neighbors’ using Euclidean distance to all
test points in the original vector space. For binary data
points the Hamminging distance is used. Each data point
is scored independently and therefore anomalies in the tem-
poral domain are undetectable. SequenceMiner computes
outliers by comparing a set of sequences using the normal-
ized longest common subsequence as the similarity metric.
Sequences that are similar are clustered together. Outliers
are sequences that have a very low similarity values with the
clusters medoid. Since sequenceMiner takes into account the
order it has the ability to identify anomalies in the temporal
domain, however it is unable to handle continuous data and
therefore does not have the ability to detect anomalies in
continuous parameters. Both the baseline algorithms have
their codes open sourced and can be obtained from the fol-
lowing links2
To test the robustness of the MKAD method synthetic
data was generated with various types of seeded faults, al-
lowing the algorithm to demonstrate its ability to detect
each anomaly and for comparison against the existing state-
of-the-art algorithms. Finally the MKAD method was com-
pared with the combined performance of Orca and SequenceM-
iner.
2https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/algorithm/orca/ and
https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/algorithm/sequenceminer-
algorithm/
3.4 Synthetic data sets
To simulate an aircraft system it was assumed that the
pilot inputs (the discrete switches) are used to influence the
measured continuous output parameters. Therefore the data
parameters were generated with this in mind. Ten binary
parameters were generated with three fundamental behav-
iors: random flipping, constant throughout, and deliberate
switching. One parameter was set to randomly switch be-
tween 0 and 1, while two parameters never changed states.
For the deliberate switching six channels would hold a value
at their initial state and change to the alternate state when
a separate channel toggled 0 to 1.
With the binary parameters generated, the underling sys-
tem state can be used to generate continuous data. To con-
struct the continuous data, each continuous parameter was
assigned a set of binary parameters as input variables. A
set of Gaussian distributions defined for each possible bi-
nary state corresponding to the continuous parameter. For
example: if a given continuous parameter was dependent on
2 binary parameters 4 distributions would be generated, if
3 binary parameters, 8 distributions and so forth (see fig-
ure 3). At each time step the continuous parameters would
draw from its defined distribution for the given state of the
binary parameters. This method allows the continuous pa-
rameters to vary directly with the state of the binary inputs
and therefore have the desired relationship assumed for this
problem.
Figure 3: The figure demonstrates a sample distribution for
a single continuous parameter that is dependent on 2 binary
parameters.
This method was repeated for each flight in the data set.
A total of 4000 flights were synthesized (2000 for training
and 2000 for testing)4. Each flight is 1500 sample points
long. Four different fault types, three examples of each,
were injected into randomly chosen flights. bodydetails
Fault type I: The first type of fault involves missing switches
and this implies that sequences of switching that was
expected at a given stage did not occur. For example,
such an event takes place when flaps not extended to
normal full deployment at landing.
4The synthesized data set can be downloaded from
https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/topic/multiple-kernel-
learning-based-heterogeneous-algorithm/
Table 1: The table represents the summary of the perfor-
mance of all three algorithms in detecting the faults in the
synthetic data for each fault category. A total of 12 faults
have been randomly injected, out of which 3 are continuous
and 9 are discrete. Clearly MKAD was the only algorithm
to detect all fault types.
Algorithms Correct detection
(of faults)
Discrete Continuous
Orca 0 100%
SequenceMiner 89% 0
MKAD method 100% 100%
Fault type II: The second kind of fault involves extra switch-
ing where sequence of switching that were not expected
did occur, such as landing gear retracted after being
deployed on final approach.
Fault type III: The final kind of discrete fault describes out
of order switch sequence. A typical example is landing
gear deployed before initial flaps when the aircraft was
below flaps limit.
Fault type IV: Apart from all the above three, abnormal
patterns (independent of discrete variables) were in-
jected in arbitrary continuous channels. Such an anomaly
may occur with high bank angles or rate of descent be-
low 1,000 ft.
After the data was generated some preprocessing steps
are required before the algorithm can be implemented. The
details of the preprocessing steps have been discussed in a
later section. Here we propose to conduct a proof- of-concept
study that demonstrates the feasibility of using the proposed
MKAD algorithm in detecting variety of anomalies those
injected in the synthetic data set.
Table 1 shows the summary of the outcomes. Since
the actual fault injection incidents are known, we are able
to evaluate the performance of all algorithms in detecting
those faults. Out of twelve injected faults, Orca was able to
find the three continuous anomalies. Even though Orca can
handle both discrete (binary) variables and continuous vari-
ables, the algorithm is unable to detect sequential anoma-
lies where the time information is embedded in some form.
SequenceMiner, using 1-σ threshold calculated from the ref-
erence set, was able to detect most of the discrete anomalies
and clearly missed all the continuous anomalies. Whereas
the MKAD technique stands out accross all the algorithms
since it was able to identify all twelve fault types (both dis-
crete and continuous).
3.5 Real World Analysis on FOQA Data
The real world data set chosen for analysis is from a re-
gional carrier in the U.S. who is part of the DNFA. All air-
craft analyze were of the same fleet and type (narrow body
jet), with a subset of flights that landed on the same run-
way at a single airport for an entire year, resulting in ap-
proximately 3500 total flights. Each flight consists of 160
parameters sampled at 1 Hz with the average flight length
approximately 1:45 hours.
3.5.1 Data Preparation
Data analysis was focused on the portion of the flight be-
tween 10,0000 ft. Mean Sea Level (MSL) to landing, using
the deployment of the thrust reversers as a means to deter-
mine touchdown. To account for parameters that recorded
bad data, such as noisy sensors or sensor values reaching
cut-off value or unreasonable data values, a conservative
data quality filter was applied to all 3500 flights, return-
ing approximately 2500 ”cleaned” flights. Since the filtering
was conservative, to insure that significant anomalies were
not removed, some flights that partially contained bad data
were not eliminated from the data set. An aggressive data
quality filter was applied to the remaining set of flights to de-
termine a nominal set for training (returning approximately
500). For parameter selection a domain expert provided a
list of 39 relevant continuous parameters that were extracted
for analysis. The flap position parameter was continuously
recorded, however is categorical in nature. Using input from
the domain expert and statistics from the data the flap pa-
rameter was discretizedd into 3 states. These 3 binary state
variables were combined with landing gear and ground spoil-
ers for sequence analysis.
The working data set consists of approximately 2500 flights
with varying lengths and each of these flights are multidi-
mensional heterogeneous time series. For continuous data,
the mean and standard deviation are calculated for each pa-
rameter across all training flights. These statistics are then
used in both training and testing to z-score normalize each
parameter and flight to maintain consistency.
3.5.2 Experimental Details
When using Orca to analyze the flights, the z-score nor-
malized temporal features of all the flights corrosponding to
the training set were concatenated. The test set was gen-
erated by concatenating all the test flights. The discrete
inputs to Orca are in standard binary format and the num-
ber of nearest neighbors were set to the default value (k=5).
For SequenceMiner the binary states (of the discrete vari-
ables) were translated into state transitions where only the
bit changes (switching) were logged as a sequence of transi-
tions. Figure 4 represents a snapshot of ten such flights rep-
resenting sequential data. The SequenceMiner model builds
clusters in the sequence space and the number of clusters
were determined to be 3 for this analysis. This is because
we observed three distinct clusters in the reference set.
Figure 4: This figure represents a snapshot of a typical se-
quences generated from the binary input. Each sequence
represents an unique flight. Examples of similar sequence
(Flight 5 and Flight 6) and dissimilar sequence (Flight 7
and Flight 9) are shown.
For the multiple kernel heterogeneous algorithm, once the
sequences are generated (Figure 4) the discrete kernel is
computed pairwise across for all possible flight combinations
in the training set. For the continuous data, each time se-
ries was SAX transformed 5 using the technique described
in Section 3.2. In the original version of SAX, the z-score
normalization is an integral part of the algorithm. However
in this research, we normalized each time series (only once)
before it is SAX transformed. We are able to maintain con-
sistency in choosing the alphabet size for both reference and
test sets. It is worth mentioning that the window size was
also kept fixed through out the analysis. The window size
and alphabet size were both set to 10. Once the SAX repre-
sentations are obtained, another kernel is computed pairwise
across for all possible flight combinations. Each element of
this kernel is the average of the pairwise comparison across
the parameters of any two flights. In the optimization, we
have set the ν parameter of one-class SVMs to 0.1. For
testing, the support vectors are used to calculate the pair-
wise similarity between all testing flights. The discrete and
continuous kernels for test data were generated in a similar
fashion as the training.
3.5.3 Result Summary
The MKAD method reported a total of 227 anomalous
flights and assigned an appropriate anomaly score to each
of these flights. A simple post-processing method is used
to rank the anomalous flights and decompose the anomaly
score of individual flight in terms of discrete (parameters)
and continuous (parameters) contributions. This results in
three distinct categories, a list of flights with anomalies in ei-
ther discrete parameters or continuous parameters or in both
(i.e. heterogeneous). The MKAD algorithm detected 19 dis-
crete, 94 continuous and 114 heterogeneous anomalies. We
have observed that the majority of the top ranking anomalies
belong to the heterogeneous category. Some of these hetero-
geneous anomalies have distinct discrete-continuous interac-
tions i.e. a sequence of unexpected events in the discrete
parameters results in some abnormal effects in the continu-
ous variables or a series of abnormal event in the continuous
parameters prompts some necessary changes in the states
of the discrete variables. We will elaborate on this using
examples in the analysis section.
3.5.4 Statistically Significant Anomaly
Using the feedback from the domain expert we identified
a good number of anomalous flights which are operationally
significant while the majority are statistically significant.
Most of the flights in the list of discrete anomalies and some
from the heterogeneous category were identified anomalous
because they fall outside the distribution of (most) observed
values. This does not necessarily mean that the detected
anomaly is operationally significant. Table 2 represents a
typical distribution of the deployment of landing gears as
a function of flap settings. According to the domain expert
there is nothing unusual in deploying the landing gear before
flap-1 setting (10◦). In fact it is acceptable if the pilot slows
down the aircraft by deploying the landing gear while tran-
siting from cruise to descent. Such an example was picked
up as a statistically significant anomaly due to the fact that
it is a low occurance event. For similiar reason, we have
observed a number of anomalous flights with either flap-1
5The source code of SAX can be obtained from the authors’
website at http://www.cs.ucr.edu/ eamonn/SAX.htm.
Table 2: The table (top) shows the details on how landing gears are deployed as a function of flap settings. The second part of
the table provides statistics on the typical settings of flaps during the landing phase. The numbers in each cell represents the
percentage of flights that fall under that particular category. This information helps explaining why some of the statistically
significant anomalies are detected by the MKAD algorithms.
Gear ordering Before Between Between
flaps 10◦ flaps 10◦ − 20◦ flaps 20◦ − 45◦
% of flights 1% 78% 21%
Flaps setting Flaps 10◦ above Flaps 10◦ below No full flaps deployed
10k feet 10k feet + full flaps at landing
% of flights 2% 96% 2%
setting before 10, 000 ft of altitude and/or full-flap not at
all deployed during landing. Table 2 provides the statistics
of various flap settings as a function of altitude. The other
important category of anomalies which resulted from this
analysis are clusters of flights with a common set of bad data
sources (bad sensors) having common tail numbers which is
a valuable maintenance information.
3.5.5 Operationally Significant Anomaly: Analysis
In this section we will present some examples identified
as operationally significant by a domain expert. The first
anomalous flight is a go-around (where the pilot aborted the
landing, climbed, circled around, and landed) and is classi-
fied by the algorithm as a heterogeneous anomaly. The top
anomalous continuous parameters are plotted in Figure 5.
All continuous parameters show abnormally high deflections
during the maneuver. The anomalies found in the discrete
sequence confirmed the maneuver by identifying the extra
switching due to the pilot retracting the landing gear and
flaps during the climb and redeploying for landing on the
second approach.
The second anomalous flight is also identified as hetero-
geneous anomaly with unusually high air speed when com-
pared to a set of reference flights. Figure 6 shows the rela-
tionship between air speed and altitude with the air speed
remaining high at 2500 ft MSL. The anomaly identified in
the sequence indicates the landing gear was deployed before
the flaps. The domain expert said that this ordering may
not be unusual but the pilot could be using the landing gear
to bleed off air speed, which is evident after the landing
gear is deployed. This behavior demonstrates an interac-
tion between the continuous and sequential variables, i.e.
due to the aircraft’s high speed at a low altitude the pilot
was prompted to deploy the landing gear, which in return
resulted in a delayed effect in a lower air speed.
The third anomalous flight is also identified as a hetero-
geneous anomaly with indications of gusty winds. The top
contributing parameters are plotted in Figure 7, with the
exception of wind speed, since it was not analyzed by the
algorithm. The domain expert saw the large swings in drift
angle and concluded that there may have been high winds.
The wind speed plot shows that there were indeed high gusts
of up to 70 mph during the approach, which is also apparent
in the control column/wheel and lateral accelerations. The
anomaly identified in the discrete sequence was that flaps
fully deployed at 45 degrees was not present at landing. The
domain expert said that landing with flaps set at 20 degrees
is considered an approved landing flaps setting for this par-
ticular aircraft and may not indicate an anomaly, however
during high cross wind conditions full flaps provide addi-
tional lift that can make it hard for the pilot maintain the
aircraft’s course, and therefore the pilot may not have de-
ployed full-flaps because of these environmental conditions.
The fourth anomalous flight is an abnormal approach and
the only one identified as a continuous anomaly (refer Figure
8). The flight shows high control column and fuel flow fluc-
tuations beginning slightly before 10 miles to landing, which
coincides with the altitude fluctuations. The domain expert
said this is an interesting flight since the pilot had abnormal
altitude deflections and was under glide slope, however the
pilot was still able to line up on glide slope at 5 miles to
landing, which is required to maintain a stable approach.
Figure 5: Top anomalous parameters associated with a go-
around. The top left plot shows the control column and
wheel positions associated with the maneuver. The top right
plot shows high fuel flow consumption related to the climb.
The bottom left plot shows the high acceleration in the lon-
gitudinal direction. The bottom right plot shows the 3 di-
mensional track of the aircraft (the go-around maneuver is
denoted by the dotted lines)
3.5.6 Discussions
It is important to note that the combined anomaly lists
from Orca and SequenceMiner were able to detect some but
not all of the 4 anomalies just discussed. For the go-around
and air speed anomalies SequenceMiner is able to detect the
anomalies, however Orca did not. Both the anomalies have
components that are sequential in nature (the go-around
having additional flaps and landing gear switches, and the
air speed anomaly deploying the landing gear early to bleed
off speed) and, therefore it upholds that SequenceMiner de-
Figure 6: For the high airspeed anomaly the top anomalous
parameter (airspeed) is plotted against altitude. The speed
limit threshold at 10,000 ft. is denoted by the dashed line
at 250 knots.
Figure 7: Top anomalous parameters associated with the
gusty wind anomaly. The top left plot shows the control
column and wheel positions. The top right plot shows the
high drift angle. The bottom left plot shows high lateral
(side-to-side) accelerations. The bottom right plot shows
the wind speed gusts.
tects the anomaly while Orca, who treats all points indepen-
dently, did not. In the case of the gusty winds and abnormal
approach anomalies, both Orca and SequenceMiner were un-
able to detect these anomalies.
Baseline results were obtained by running Orca, SequenceM-
iner and compared with those obtained from MKADmethod
on the FOQA data set described above. It has been ob-
served that the average flight length is approximately 1500
sample points in this data set. Based on this information
we allowed Orca to report back the same number of sample
points (≈ 350, 000) which is equivalent to those 227 flights
identified by MKAD. Any flight that had less than 15 sam-
ple points labeled anomalous which is approximately 1% of
the average flight length and this resulted in 674 outliers
reported by Orca. For SequenceMiner we have calculated
a 2−sigma threshold from the reference set and considered
any sequence that was above that threshold in the test set
Figure 8: Top anomalous parameters associated with the
abnormal approach anomaly. The top left plot shows the
high control column position. The top right plot shows the
large swings in fuel flow activity. The bottom plot shows
the altitude vs. the distance to landing with the glide slope
and glide slope deviation superimposed.
as an outlier, resulting in 72 anomalous flights.
Table 3 shows the overlap between the baseline algorithms
and MKAD. As expected Orca performs well at detecting
mostly the continuous anomalies found by MKAD, while Se-
quenceMiner identifies anomalies related to discrete and/or
heterogeneous anomalies found by MKAD. However MKAD
still finds a significant number of anomalies that the com-
bined baseline set does not detect. From the proof of con-
cept study we have observed these limitations of Orca and
SequenceMiner in identifying anomalies which are respec-
tively discrete and continuous in nature. This is due to the
fundamental nature of the baseline algorithms. However the
MKAD is able to compress and appropriately combine the
information from both discrete and continuous domain, to
detect anomalies. This has also been reflected in the analy-
sis of the real world data set, where the baseline algorithms
missed some of the operationally significant anomalies de-
tected by MKAD.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The current state-of-the-art algorithms have both strengths
and short comings in detecting a variety of anomalous con-
ditions, as discussed in the detection of the 4 real world
anomalous flights. The MKAD method aims to combine
both strengths into a single approach to allow for detection
of a variety of anomalies. This is not to say the proposed al-
gorithm is able to find all possible anomalies in the data, but
rather that it is robust enough to find a significant overlap
with the current state-of-the-art methods while also detect-
ing additional operationally significant anomalies in hetero-
geneous data sources. Other approaches such as exceedance
queries can be very efficient in detecting specific anomalies,
however the goal is not to continue to find anomalies that
are already being studied, but to develop a novel method
that ”..answers some of the questions what we didn’t think
to ask..” while analyzing FOQA data set.
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